The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. A New History of the Peloponnesian War. Volume I.
Beautiful Letters| N° d'inventaire | 22305 |
| Format | 15 x 21.5 |
| Détails | 512 p., paperback. |
| Publication | Paris, 2019 |
| Etat | Nine |
| ISBN | 9782251449807 |
The first in a series of four books devoted to the history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), this book studies the causes of the conflict and takes the opposite view of Thucydides' thesis. In the five parts that make up the work, Donald Kagan examines the institutional and informal functioning of the alliance systems in place and traces the history of the constitution of the Spartan alliance and the Delian League (1). Then, he restores the troubled context of the mid-5th century by recalling the events of what has been called the "First Peloponnesian War" (around 460-445) and the Thirty Years' Peace (2 and 3), up to the three crises of the year 433 (the confrontation between Corcyra and Corinth around Epidamnus, the siege of Potidaea, the "Decree of Megara") which would precipitate the two blocs into war (4). A series of conclusions (5) examine and criticize the various theses on the causes of the conflict, and in particular those of Thucydides on "the truest cause", on the responsibility of Pericles and on the inevitability of war. Restoring, each time that literary and epigraphic evidence allows it, the link between the internal affairs, the constitutional organization and the foreign policy of the cities concerned, Donald Kagan examines anew the question of the origins and causes of the Peloponnesian War by concentrating on this question: was war inevitable? Thucydides thought it was. The argumentative organization, the antilogies, the choice and order of exposition of the reported speeches, the elements passed over in silence and the narrative construction, everything in Thucydides' text is designed to leave no alternative to war and to convince us of its inevitability "from the moment when the Athenian empire had been allowed to exist". Kagan believes that the conflict was not inevitable, and his demonstration makes this great history book a political science manual: it helps to educate and sharpen our gaze to teach it to discern all the paths, all the bifurcations, all the possibilities that allow different, competing, even rival societies to remain in politics and avoid having to continue it "by other means." Preface Abbreviations Introduction PART ONE. THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM AND THE DIVISION OF THE GREEK WORLD Chapter 1. The Lacedaemonian Alliance Chapter 2. The Origins of the Athenian Empire Chapter 3. Situation of Sparta after the Persian Wars Chapter 4. Situation of Athens after the Persian Wars PART TWO. THE FIRST PELOPONNESIAN WAR Chapter 5. The War in Greece Chapter 6. The Crisis in the Aegean Sea Chapter 7. The End of the War PART THREE. THE YEARS OF PEACE Chapter 8. Athenian Political Life: The Victory of Pericles Chapter 9. Athens and the West: The Foundation of Thurioi Chapter 10. The Samian Revolt Chapter 11. The Consolidation of the Empire Chapter 12. A Picture of Athenian Political Life on the Eve of the War PART FOUR. THE FINAL CRISIS Chapter 13. Epidamnus Chapter 14. Corcyra Chapter 15. Megara Chapter 16. Potidaea Chapter 17. Sparta Chapter 18. Athens PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS Chapter 19. The Causes of War Chapter 20. Thucydides and the Inevitability of War Appendices A. How Willing Were the Members of the Delian League to Accept Athenian Leadership? B. On the Historicity of Diodorus' Account of the Spartan Assembly of 475 C. On the Chronology of Events from 470-453 D. On the Reconstruction of Athenian Tribute Lists E. The Papyrus Decree F. On the Founding of Thurioi G. On Athenian Maneuvers in the West Between the Two Wars H. On Athens' Treatment of Byzantium I. On the Date of Pericles' Pontic Expedition J. On the Site and Date of Founding of Brea K. On the Date of the Battle of Potidaea Notes Bibliography General Index Index of Ancient Authors and Inscriptions Index of Modern Authors
The first in a series of four books devoted to the history of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), this book studies the causes of the conflict and takes the opposite view of Thucydides' thesis. In the five parts that make up the work, Donald Kagan examines the institutional and informal functioning of the alliance systems in place and traces the history of the constitution of the Spartan alliance and the Delian League (1). Then, he restores the troubled context of the mid-5th century by recalling the events of what has been called the "First Peloponnesian War" (around 460-445) and the Thirty Years' Peace (2 and 3), up to the three crises of the year 433 (the confrontation between Corcyra and Corinth around Epidamnus, the siege of Potidaea, the "Decree of Megara") which would precipitate the two blocs into war (4). A series of conclusions (5) examine and criticize the various theses on the causes of the conflict, and in particular those of Thucydides on "the truest cause", on the responsibility of Pericles and on the inevitability of war. Restoring, each time that literary and epigraphic evidence allows it, the link between the internal affairs, the constitutional organization and the foreign policy of the cities concerned, Donald Kagan examines anew the question of the origins and causes of the Peloponnesian War by concentrating on this question: was war inevitable? Thucydides thought it was. The argumentative organization, the antilogies, the choice and order of exposition of the reported speeches, the elements passed over in silence and the narrative construction, everything in Thucydides' text is designed to leave no alternative to war and to convince us of its inevitability "from the moment when the Athenian empire had been allowed to exist". Kagan believes that the conflict was not inevitable, and his demonstration makes this great history book a political science manual: it helps to educate and sharpen our gaze to teach it to discern all the paths, all the bifurcations, all the possibilities that allow different, competing, even rival societies to remain in politics and avoid having to continue it "by other means." Preface Abbreviations Introduction PART ONE. THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM AND THE DIVISION OF THE GREEK WORLD Chapter 1. The Lacedaemonian Alliance Chapter 2. The Origins of the Athenian Empire Chapter 3. Situation of Sparta after the Persian Wars Chapter 4. Situation of Athens after the Persian Wars PART TWO. THE FIRST PELOPONNESIAN WAR Chapter 5. The War in Greece Chapter 6. The Crisis in the Aegean Sea Chapter 7. The End of the War PART THREE. THE YEARS OF PEACE Chapter 8. Athenian Political Life: The Victory of Pericles Chapter 9. Athens and the West: The Foundation of Thurioi Chapter 10. The Samian Revolt Chapter 11. The Consolidation of the Empire Chapter 12. A Picture of Athenian Political Life on the Eve of the War PART FOUR. THE FINAL CRISIS Chapter 13. Epidamnus Chapter 14. Corcyra Chapter 15. Megara Chapter 16. Potidaea Chapter 17. Sparta Chapter 18. Athens PART FIVE. CONCLUSIONS Chapter 19. The Causes of War Chapter 20. Thucydides and the Inevitability of War Appendices A. How Willing Were the Members of the Delian League to Accept Athenian Leadership? B. On the Historicity of Diodorus' Account of the Spartan Assembly of 475 C. On the Chronology of Events from 470-453 D. On the Reconstruction of Athenian Tribute Lists E. The Papyrus Decree F. On the Founding of Thurioi G. On Athenian Maneuvers in the West Between the Two Wars H. On Athens' Treatment of Byzantium I. On the Date of Pericles' Pontic Expedition J. On the Site and Date of Founding of Brea K. On the Date of the Battle of Potidaea Notes Bibliography General Index Index of Ancient Authors and Inscriptions Index of Modern Authors