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Archidamus' War. A New History of the Peloponnesian War II.
KAGAN Donald.

Archidamus' War. A New History of the Peloponnesian War II.

The Beautiful Letters
€35,00 €0,00
N° d'inventaire 23990
Format 15 x 21.5
Détails 444 p., paperback.
Publication Paris, 2021
Etat Nine
ISBN 9782251449814
It is Thucydides who constitutes the events known as the "Peloponnesian War" as a single whole, a single war. As Donald Kagan has shown in the first volume of his tetralogy, he does so at the cost of an etiological reduction that allows him to transform his study of the causes of the confrontation between Athens and Sparta into a unifying teleology. Nevertheless, four major phases are traditionally distinguished in the whole thus delineated by Thucydides: a first ten-year conflict (431-421), the subject of this work, the "War of Archidamus," which was brought to an end by a peace treaty that was not respected: the Peace of Nicias (421-416). This second, troubled period, which saw the conclusion of new alliances and the emergence of new actors, was marked by a major confrontation, the Battle of Mantinea (418). The Sicilian expedition (416-413), which dominated the third phase, clarified the situation: it forced Athens, in order to please its allies fighting alongside it in Sicily, to attack coastal cities in the Peloponnese, which constituted a clear violation of the treaty concluded in 421 and officially relaunched hostilities between Athens and Sparta. The destruction of the Athenian fleet and expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 opened the fourth and final period of the war, a decade marked by the disintegration of the Athenian empire and which culminated in the siege and capitulation of Athens in 404.
The first years of the war saw two radically opposed strategies clash, almost purely. However, on both sides, these initial strategies quickly reached their limits. It was by gradually and then frankly breaking with them and by shifting the conflict to secondary fronts that the successors of Pericles and Archidamus changed the situation.
By making connections with modern and contemporary military history, by paying close attention to the internal political life of Athens and Sparta, by making good use of the tools of counterfactual history, Donald Kagan continues his critical reading of Thucydides and delivers highly intelligent analyses of both the general strategies of each camp and the tactics implemented in each battle.
It is Thucydides who constitutes the events known as the "Peloponnesian War" as a single whole, a single war. As Donald Kagan has shown in the first volume of his tetralogy, he does so at the cost of an etiological reduction that allows him to transform his study of the causes of the confrontation between Athens and Sparta into a unifying teleology. Nevertheless, four major phases are traditionally distinguished in the whole thus delineated by Thucydides: a first ten-year conflict (431-421), the subject of this work, the "War of Archidamus," which was brought to an end by a peace treaty that was not respected: the Peace of Nicias (421-416). This second, troubled period, which saw the conclusion of new alliances and the emergence of new actors, was marked by a major confrontation, the Battle of Mantinea (418). The Sicilian expedition (416-413), which dominated the third phase, clarified the situation: it forced Athens, in order to please its allies fighting alongside it in Sicily, to attack coastal cities in the Peloponnese, which constituted a clear violation of the treaty concluded in 421 and officially relaunched hostilities between Athens and Sparta. The destruction of the Athenian fleet and expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 opened the fourth and final period of the war, a decade marked by the disintegration of the Athenian empire and which culminated in the siege and capitulation of Athens in 404.
The first years of the war saw two radically opposed strategies clash, almost purely. However, on both sides, these initial strategies quickly reached their limits. It was by gradually and then frankly breaking with them and by shifting the conflict to secondary fronts that the successors of Pericles and Archidamus changed the situation.
By making connections with modern and contemporary military history, by paying close attention to the internal political life of Athens and Sparta, by making good use of the tools of counterfactual history, Donald Kagan continues his critical reading of Thucydides and delivers highly intelligent analyses of both the general strategies of each camp and the tactics implemented in each battle.