The Fall of the Athenian Empire. A New History of the Peloponnesian War. IV.
Belles-Lettres| N° d'inventaire | 30642 |
| Format | 15 x 21.5 |
| Détails | 576 p., paperback. |
| Publication | Paris, 2024 |
| Etat | Nine |
| ISBN | |
Why, despite having managed to survive and recover from the disaster of the Sicilian expedition, did the Athenians ultimately lose the war? This is the question Donald Kagan addresses in this fourth and final volume of his New History of the Peloponnesian War .
The work covers the ten years from the immediate aftermath of the destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 until the capitulation of Athens in 404. The period is marked by the shift of the main theater of operations to the Aegean Sea, to the coasts of Asia Minor and to the Hellespont, after the construction by the Spartans of a permanent fort at Decelea and the installation of an army commanded by Agis, one of the kings of Sparta, had blocked the game in Attica. Deprived of Attica and its agricultural and mineral resources, and while they were fighting to maintain control of their empire and the revenues they derived from it, the Euboean revolt of 411 sowed panic among the Athenians. Athens was left with no other source of wheat than the granary around the Euxine Sea. Control of the straits (Hellespont and Bosphorus) then became vital, at the very moment when it was being contested.
In his analysis of this new context, Kagan highlights the definitive victory of the strategies formerly promoted by Demosthenes and Cleon on the one hand, and by Brasidas on the other, over the Pericleo-Archidanian scheme that had characterized the early years of the war. More precisely, it was by radicalizing the Archidamian strategy (by establishing a permanent land blockade of Attica) and by complementing it with that of Brasidas (opening new fronts and concluding new alliances in the East) that the Peloponnesian camp was going to provoke a real rupture in the conflict by the intervention of a new actor: the Persians, animated by the hope of recovering the cities of Asia Minor lost after the Persian Wars.
This new strategy was taken over by Alcibiades and Lysander, who indissolubly combined military and diplomatic responsibilities. Lysander, however, had the advantage over Alcibiades of being a better tactician and diplomat, and above all of not being discredited in his own camp. Having secured reliable support from the Persians upon the arrival at the helm of Cyrus the Younger, the new satrap of Ionia, Lysander was able to complete the Brasidian plan by obtaining the means to finance and train a powerful fleet, finally capable of rivaling that of the Athenians. A brilliant and highly ambitious strategist, Lysander then won two decisive naval victories at Notion (in 406) and Aigos-Potamoï (in 405). The latter saw the annihilation of the Athenian fleet and the return of the bulk of the Spartan army to Attica to lay siege to Athens. Lysander's wiles quickly condemned the city to famine, and peace was signed in 404. Athens' defeat was total, but temporary.
Why, despite having managed to survive and recover from the disaster of the Sicilian expedition, did the Athenians ultimately lose the war? This is the question Donald Kagan addresses in this fourth and final volume of his New History of the Peloponnesian War .
The work covers the ten years from the immediate aftermath of the destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily in 413 until the capitulation of Athens in 404. The period is marked by the shift of the main theater of operations to the Aegean Sea, to the coasts of Asia Minor and to the Hellespont, after the construction by the Spartans of a permanent fort at Decelea and the installation of an army commanded by Agis, one of the kings of Sparta, had blocked the game in Attica. Deprived of Attica and its agricultural and mineral resources, and while they were fighting to maintain control of their empire and the revenues they derived from it, the Euboean revolt of 411 sowed panic among the Athenians. Athens was left with no other source of wheat than the granary around the Euxine Sea. Control of the straits (Hellespont and Bosphorus) then became vital, at the very moment when it was being contested.
In his analysis of this new context, Kagan highlights the definitive victory of the strategies formerly promoted by Demosthenes and Cleon on the one hand, and by Brasidas on the other, over the Pericleo-Archidanian scheme that had characterized the early years of the war. More precisely, it was by radicalizing the Archidamian strategy (by establishing a permanent land blockade of Attica) and by complementing it with that of Brasidas (opening new fronts and concluding new alliances in the East) that the Peloponnesian camp was going to provoke a real rupture in the conflict by the intervention of a new actor: the Persians, animated by the hope of recovering the cities of Asia Minor lost after the Persian Wars.
This new strategy was taken over by Alcibiades and Lysander, who indissolubly combined military and diplomatic responsibilities. Lysander, however, had the advantage over Alcibiades of being a better tactician and diplomat, and above all of not being discredited in his own camp. Having secured reliable support from the Persians upon the arrival at the helm of Cyrus the Younger, the new satrap of Ionia, Lysander was able to complete the Brasidian plan by obtaining the means to finance and train a powerful fleet, finally capable of rivaling that of the Athenians. A brilliant and highly ambitious strategist, Lysander then won two decisive naval victories at Notion (in 406) and Aigos-Potamoï (in 405). The latter saw the annihilation of the Athenian fleet and the return of the bulk of the Spartan army to Attica to lay siege to Athens. Lysander's wiles quickly condemned the city to famine, and peace was signed in 404. Athens' defeat was total, but temporary.