
ICARDI Giulia.
Asserting Power by Sea: Rivalry for Hegemony in Greece in the First Half of the Fourth Century BC
MOM
Regular price
€50,00
N° d'inventaire | 31008 |
Format | 21 x 29.7 |
Détails | 388 p., numerous color photographs, paperback. |
Publication | Lyon, 2024 |
Etat | Nine |
ISBN | 9782356680877 |
One of the consequences of the Peloponnesian War was the development of a large-scale naval policy on the part of two land powers: Sparta and the Boeotian Confederation. During the period of their respective hegemonies (404–371 BC; 371–362 BC), they had to turn to the sea to counter the power that Athens traditionally exercised there, thus putting an end to the idea of a divided hegemony between Sparta, an exclusively land-based power, and Athens, mistress of the sea.
This necessity led Sparta and Boeotia to adapt to meet the constraints imposed by naval warfare and the control of strategic locations. Different questions arise in analyzing the attempts of these two realities, strongly linked to the land and the hoplite army, to implement a naval policy. First, the resources, in money, men, and materials, for the construction and maintenance of a fleet and military ports; then the layout and development of urban sites near the sea and their connection with navigation and the control of roads and territory; the hierarchy and functions of fleet commanders; and finally, international relations aimed at creating links with important locations from the point of view of naval strategy.
This necessity led Sparta and Boeotia to adapt to meet the constraints imposed by naval warfare and the control of strategic locations. Different questions arise in analyzing the attempts of these two realities, strongly linked to the land and the hoplite army, to implement a naval policy. First, the resources, in money, men, and materials, for the construction and maintenance of a fleet and military ports; then the layout and development of urban sites near the sea and their connection with navigation and the control of roads and territory; the hierarchy and functions of fleet commanders; and finally, international relations aimed at creating links with important locations from the point of view of naval strategy.
One of the consequences of the Peloponnesian War was the development of a large-scale naval policy on the part of two land powers: Sparta and the Boeotian Confederation. During the period of their respective hegemonies (404–371 BC; 371–362 BC), they had to turn to the sea to counter the power that Athens traditionally exercised there, thus putting an end to the idea of a divided hegemony between Sparta, an exclusively land-based power, and Athens, mistress of the sea.
This necessity led Sparta and Boeotia to adapt to meet the constraints imposed by naval warfare and the control of strategic locations. Different questions arise in analyzing the attempts of these two realities, strongly linked to the land and the hoplite army, to implement a naval policy. First, the resources, in money, men, and materials, for the construction and maintenance of a fleet and military ports; then the layout and development of urban sites near the sea and their connection with navigation and the control of roads and territory; the hierarchy and functions of fleet commanders; and finally, international relations aimed at creating links with important locations from the point of view of naval strategy.
This necessity led Sparta and Boeotia to adapt to meet the constraints imposed by naval warfare and the control of strategic locations. Different questions arise in analyzing the attempts of these two realities, strongly linked to the land and the hoplite army, to implement a naval policy. First, the resources, in money, men, and materials, for the construction and maintenance of a fleet and military ports; then the layout and development of urban sites near the sea and their connection with navigation and the control of roads and territory; the hierarchy and functions of fleet commanders; and finally, international relations aimed at creating links with important locations from the point of view of naval strategy.